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The Future of the Supreme Court: 
Institutional Reform and Beyond 
David R. Stras† and Karla Vehrs∗ 
The Supreme Court of the United States is facing a poten-
tially defining moment in its history. Samuel A. Alito, Jr. has 
replaced Justice Sandra Day O’Connor to become the 110th 
Justice of the Supreme Court. The Senate’s confirmation of 
Judge Alito may shift the ideological balance of the Supreme 
Court to the right, potentially fulfilling President George W. 
Bush’s campaign pledge to nominate Justices in the mold of 
Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas.1 
Perhaps more importantly, Chief Justice William H. 
Rehnquist passed away on September 3, 2005, after battling 
thyroid cancer for several months. In his place, President Bush 
nominated District of Columbia Circuit Judge John G. Roberts 
to become the seventeenth Chief Justice of the United States. 
Following the first confirmation hearing in this country in over  
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 1. Prior to nominating Judge Alito, President Bush nominated his White 
House Counsel, Harriet Miers, to fill Justice O’Connor’s seat, but Ms. Miers 
ultimately withdrew, in part because the popular press and blogosphere re-
lentlessly attacked her ostensible lack of qualifications to sit on the Supreme 
Court. See Robin Toner, et al., Steady Erosion in Support Undercut Nomina-
tion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2005, at A16. 
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eleven years, Chief Justice Roberts was confirmed by the Sen-
ate by a vote of 78–22. 
When we began planning this symposium in February 
2005, we never could have envisioned the tumultuous months 
that followed. Regardless, the replacement of perhaps the two 
most significant legal figures of the past twenty years provides 
a unique opportunity to consider the future of the Supreme 
Court of the United States. 
Our paramount goal in planning this symposium was to 
bring together a talented group of scholars to consider the insti-
tutional characteristics of the Supreme Court. The legal litera-
ture is replete with articles considering the legal and policy im-
plications of Supreme Court decisions, but contains 
comparatively few analyzing the Court as an institution.2 As 
time passed and the event loomed closer, it became increasingly 
clear that another goal of the symposium would be to offer sug-
gestions to the new Roberts Court and Congress on the function 
and direction of the Supreme Court. With these goals in mind, 
thirteen leading scholars accepted our invitation to participate 
in this symposium. 
We divided the participants into four panels, with Profes-
sor Adrian Vermeule presenting an introductory lecture on the 
feasibility of Supreme Court reform. The symposium’s first 
panel, consisting of Professors Michael Gerhardt, Daniel Far-
ber, and Randy Barnett, addressed the role of precedent at the 
Supreme Court. The panel discussed at length the controversial 
issue of whether “super precedent” exists. The timeliness of the 
exchange was revealed when it was made the subject of an arti-
cle by law professor Jeffrey Rosen in the New York Times a 
week after the symposium.3 The second panel, including Pro-
fessors Thomas Lee, Angela Onwuachi-Willig, and Mark 
Tushnet, examined the role of external influences on the deci-
sion making of the Justices, considering, among other issues,  
 
 
 2. Political scientists have done a far better job at analyzing the institu-
tional characteristics of the Supreme Court, as demonstrated by some recent 
books on the subject. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT 
IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (2005); SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: 
NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman 
eds., 1999). However, much of this research is descriptive institutional analy-
sis and accordingly fails to make normative suggestions about the Supreme 
Court as an institution. 
 3. See Jeffrey Rosen, So, Do You Believe in ‘Superprecedent’?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 30, 2005, § 4, at 1. 
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individual backgrounds, cultural norms, and foreign laws. The 
third group of panelists, consisting of Professors Stephen 
Smith, Martin Redish, and Neal Devins, addressed the appar-
ent tension between the intensely political controversies the 
Supreme Court decides and its role as a neutral arbiter of legal 
disputes. Finally, the fourth panel, consisting of Professors 
David Stras and Steven Calabresi, and Dean Kenneth Starr, 
assessed the implications of the Supreme Court’s shrinking 
docket and workload. 
 The following pages contain Essays resulting from the 
symposium. In his introductory Essay, Professor Vermeule dis-
cusses the difficulties inherent in achieving institutional reform 
of the Supreme Court. He posits that political factors fre-
quently give rise to a reform versus counter-reform equilib-
rium, where strong movements in favor of reform create 
equally strong obstacles to reform, most often rendering sub-
stantive reform unlikely. The challenges to Supreme Court re-
form include the failure of traditional political alliances; the 
difficulty in achieving an optimal majority; the delicate balance 
necessary for leaders to advocate for reform yet not act merely 
in self-interest; and the need for political crises, which can 
serve as both the engine and the brakes for reform proposals. 
Professor Vermeule concludes that the interests of the Supreme 
Court are best served when those with expertise in a particular 
field put forth what are, in their best judgment, optimal pro-
posals for reform, leaving the political wrangling to those actors 
involved in the political process. 
Professor Gerhardt examines the concept of “super prece-
dent” raised during the recent confirmation hearings of Chief 
Justice Roberts.4 He identifies three different areas where the 
term might be applied: fundamental institutional practices of 
the Court, foundational doctrines for approaching constitu-
tional interpretation, and individual Supreme Court holdings 
that are repeatedly affirmed by the Court, accepted by other 
branches, and relied upon by the public. Professor Gerhardt 
concludes that the introduction of the term “super precedent” 
into the legal vocabulary may significantly impact the future of 
the Supreme Court, including the way in which confirmation  
 
 
 4. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be 
Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing on S. 109–158 Before the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2–4 (2005) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter, 
Chairman, Senate Committee on the Judiciary). 
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hearings are conducted and the way judges and scholars ana-
lyze the Court’s precedents.5 
Professor Farber examines the tension between stare de-
cisis and originalism. In response to originalism, he points out 
that a complete rejection of stare decisis is impracticable be-
cause of evolving views of history, methodological differences in 
judging, and the difficulty of assigning a static meaning to the 
broad terms in the Constitution. Professor Farber concludes 
that constitutional stare decisis, much like the Constitution it-
self, is worthwhile because it is adaptable and accommodating; 
constitutional precedent does not result in bright-line rules, but 
instead in functional guidelines that allow for the evolution of 
constitutional doctrine. 
In addition to having the most colorful title in the sympo-
sium, “It’s a Bird, It’s a Plane, No, It’s Super Precedent: A Re-
sponse to Farber and Gerhardt,” Professor Barnett takes issue 
with those who would argue that super precedents ought to be 
immune from reversal. He points out that, at the time they 
were decided, cases such as Dred Scott and Plessy would have 
been considered super precedents, but that this ultimately had 
no bearing on whether they were decided correctly under an 
originalist view of the Constitution. The benefit of hindsight 
tells us that reliance on the Constitution to support these deci-
sions was misplaced and that, despite sociological motivations 
to the contrary, the Court ought to have reversed them sooner. 
He concludes that historical and sociological factors provide the 
true inertia behind super precedents and that constitutional 
stare decisis upholding “super precedents” might well be super-
fluous. 
Professor Onwuachi-Willig proposes an increase in the 
number of Justices on the Supreme Court from nine to fifteen 
to facilitate greater diversity on the Supreme Court. Her view 
is premised on the argument that the background of Justices, 
including their race, sex, class, and religion, to name just a few, 
has a profound impact on their approaches to judicial decision-
making. Professor Onwuachi-Willig argues that the goal of 
greater representation for minority voices can be effectively 
achieved through an increase in the number of seats available 
on the Supreme Court. 
 
 5. Judge J. Michael Luttig first raised the issue of “super stare decisis” 
with respect to abortion in Richmond Medical Center for Women v. Gilmore, 
219 F.3d 376, 376 (4th Cir. 2000). 
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Professor Tushnet addresses some of the criticisms leveled 
against federal judges for citing foreign and international 
sources of law. He categorizes these criticisms into a few main 
concerns: that foreign law is given too much weight by Ameri-
can judges; that citations to foreign law are irrelevant to 
judges’ holdings and thus superfluous; that foreign laws do not 
embody the same legal norms that American laws do; and that 
American judges are insufficiently informed about foreign laws 
to wield such a tool skillfully. Professor Tushnet concludes that 
all but a small number of these criticisms are unfair because 
many of the same criticisms can be directed towards other 
sources of law that judges examine and rely upon in order to 
decide the cases before them. 
Professor Devins argues that today’s Supreme Court 
should not worry about upsetting political actors with its deci-
sions. Unlike the Warren Court era, for example, today’s legis-
lators are more focused on appeasing their constituents, par-
ties, and special-interest groups than on pushing for true 
change of the Supreme Court. He argues that Court-curbing 
proposals are much less likely to succeed today than in the past 
because legislators lack genuine interest in real reform. Be-
cause the Court and Congress are often in lockstep with respect 
to their political views, the Court can be reasonably certain 
that few institution-altering proposals will actually be enacted 
into law. 
Professor Redish and his coauthor, Uma Amuluru, address 
the constitutionality of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, which 
established the Supreme Court’s role in promulgating and 
amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Over time, they 
argue, experience has demonstrated that it is often impossible 
to separate substantive issues from the procedural ones in mat-
ters of civil adjudication, and that procedural rules can under-
mine the policy judgments of Congress. Consequently, Redish 
and Amuluru conclude that the Rules Enabling Act may well 
constitute an unconstitutional delegation of lawmaking author-
ity to the Supreme Court. 
Professor Stras examines the role of economic incentives in 
inducing the timely retirement of Supreme Court Justices. He 
constructs an economic model that includes the relevant vari-
ables, such as workload, income, and prestige, which have the 
most impact on the retirement decisions of Justices. Such a 
model, he argues, can help us better understand the decision 
making of Justices in purely personal areas. He concludes that, 
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based on the incentives approach to retirement, Congress 
should focus its attention on making incremental institutional 
modifications, such as to pensions and workload, rather than 
enacting command-and-control measures such as term limits or 
a mandatory retirement age for Justices. 
Professor Calabresi and his coauthor, David Presser, pro-
pose that Congress reinstitute the practice of “circuit riding,” 
the long-abandoned requirement that Justices spend a certain 
amount of time each year in their assigned judicial circuits 
hearing lower court cases. Specifically, their proposal would re-
quire Justices to spend four weeks in July serving as district 
court judges and presiding over trials. Calabresi and Presser 
conclude that circuit riding would serve several important in-
stitutional interests, including reacquainting Justices with 
American culture outside of Washington; inducing earlier re-
tirements; and preventing the undue influence of foreign law on 
Supreme Court decisions, which they contend is stimulated by 
Justices spending their summer recesses abroad. 
Dean Starr examines the impact that William Howard 
Taft, the former President turned Chief Justice, had on the Su-
preme Court. Taft shepherded through Congress what became 
the Judiciary Act of 1925, which established discretionary cer-
tiorari jurisdiction for the Court. Starr believes that the 
Rehnquist Court’s reliance on certiorari jurisdiction to reduce 
the number of cases on the Court’s merits docket has been an 
unfortunate development. In failing to use the certiorari tool 
cautiously as Taft intended, the Court has often neglected im-
portant, unresolved questions of federal law and vexing circuit 
splits. 
The transformational change the Court is undergoing is 
certain to accelerate over the next decade as additional Justices 
retire.6 This transformation provides an occasion to challenge 
some of our fundamental assumptions about the Supreme 
Court and to provide normative recommendations about its fu-
ture. It is our belief that one of the most fertile and under-
 
 6. Now that Judge Alito has been confirmed, six of the nine Justices are 
older than 65. By the time this symposium issue is printed, three Justices—
John Paul Stevens, Antonin Scalia, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg—will be more 
than 70 years old. One other Justice—Anthony Kennedy—will turn 70 this 
summer. By historical standards, this is a very elderly Supreme Court, and we 
can anticipate more retirements over the next several years. See Oyez, U.S. 
Supreme Court Justices: A Listing of all Supreme Court Justices, http://www 
.oyez.org/oyez/portlet/justices/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2006) (follow the Justices’ 
names hyperlinks to find brief biographies of each Justice). 
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explored areas of legal scholarship is the analysis and evalua-
tion of the institutional characteristics of the Supreme Court. It 
is our hope that this symposium is a significant step in advanc-
ing that discussion. 
